North Dakota Products Liability Law: A Litigator\u27s Guide by Bucklin, Leonard
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 67 Number 1 Article 1 
1991 
North Dakota Products Liability Law: A Litigator's Guide 
Leonard Bucklin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bucklin, Leonard (1991) "North Dakota Products Liability Law: A Litigator's Guide," North Dakota Law 
Review: Vol. 67 : No. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol67/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 




The North Dakota Supreme Court has observed that "strict
liability for products has developed as a highly specialized body of
law."1 This specialized body of law is added to the law the trial
attorney should know regarding liability for products because of
negligence, warranty and misrepresentation.
This article is intended to be a quick guide to North Dakota
products liability law, and to provide comments on emerging
developments. This article assumes the reader has a basic under-
standing of products liability law. It discusses the most significant
case law in North Dakota products liability.
II. STRICT LIABILITY THEORY CONTRASTED WITH
NEGLIGENCE THEORY
Four generations ago, when a product injured a consumer, the
lawyer thought first of warranty or misrepresentation law.2 The
basic question the lawyer investigated was what promises had
been made by the seller of the goods to the buyer.3 Developments
in the law during the last fifty years have changed what a lawyer
needs to consider.
Two generations ago, when a product accident occurred, the
lawyer thought first of negligence law.4 The basic question he
investigated was whether the manufacturer had acted reasonably
in his design, construction, and warnings before putting the prod-
uct into the hands of the consumer.5
In contrast, when a consumer is injured, today's lawyer thinks
first of strict liability.6 Moreover, the attorney's thoughts will turn
to the differences of recovery under strict liability theory, as distin-
* B.S. in Law (1955) and J.D. (1957), University of Minnesota; Fellow and Director,
International Academy of Trial Lawyers; President of the Bucklin Trial Lawyers P.C.,
Bismarck, North Dakota.
1. Jacobs v. Anderson Building Co., 459 N.W.2d 384, 388 (N.D. 1990).
2. See generally Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
3. E.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913Xdiscussing implied
warranty from seller to buyer).
4. See generally Prosser, supra note 2.
5. See generally Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Products Supplier: A
Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521 (1974).
6. See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
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guished from the negligence theory. To understand the choices
that the lawyer, and the judge, must make in handling a products
liability suit today, we must review negligence theory and contrast
it with strict liability theory.
When a North Dakota jury is charged to determine whether
negligence exists, it usually is instructed:
"Ordinary negligence" is the lack of ordinary care
and diligence required by the circumstances. Ordinary
care or diligence means such care as a person of ordinary
prudence usually exercises about his own affairs of ordi-
nary importance.
Negligence involves a lack of such concern for the
probable consequences of an act or failure to act as a per-
son of ordinary prudence would have had in conducting
his affairs. It is the lack of such care as persons of common
sense and ordinary prudence usually exercise under the
same or similar circumstances.7
In contrast to the negligence instruction, the rule regarding
strict liability states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition
in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller.'
The rules of negligence and strict liability are stated simply;
the problem is in their application. The usual definition of strict
product liability says nothing about a community standard or
7. North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions, NDJI-Civil 105 (1986).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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about the need for a manufacturer to use reasonable care. Yet the
application of strict liability theory in a trial, like the application of
negligence theory, actually involves a community standard of
care. To understand why a community standard is involved, we
first focus on some frequently cited North Dakota cases.
Johnson v. American Motors Corp.9 adopted the doctrine of
strict product liability set out in the Restatement of Torts (Second)
Section 402A.' ° Johnson then proceeded to discuss what in the
court's view this doctrine required when applied to the case
before it (a case where the consumer, instead of a product defect,
caused the accident). The court concluded that the doctrine of
strict liability requires that the manufacturer protect the user
against the foreseeable misuse of its products. 1
Enter the community standard! If the auto manufacturer
must guard against accidents not of the manufacturer's cause,
which accidents must the manufacturer guard against? The jury -
the community - must make the decision.
This requirement of "unreasonableness" in the product is
underlined in Kaufman v. Meditec, Inc.'2 In Kaufman, the court
found that the 1985 version of the Pattern Jury Instruction on
products liability was insufficient because it did not contain the
statutory definition of "unreasonably dangerous.' 3 In short, the
requirement of "unreasonable danger" is an integral part of the
strict liability doctrine in North Dakota. The product is not defec-
tive unless it is "unreasonably" dangerous for the user.'
4
Now we have it: "unreasonableness" has crept back into the
strict liability doctrine. But the unreasonableness now is not
judged on a standard involving actions of a person; it is judged on a
community standard involving the product.
This distinction between judging the product instead of the
person was emphasized by the court in Mauch v. Manufacturers
Sales and Service."5 Mauch gave instructions to the trial court that
the strict liability doctrine, which places emphasis on the product,
9. 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974).
10. Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57, 66 (N.D. 1974).
11. Id. at 65.
12. 353 N.W.2d 297 (N.D. 1984).
13. Kaufman v. Medite, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 297, 300-01 (N.D. 1974). See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.1-05(2) (Supp. 1989) (defining "unreasonably dangerous" as dangerous
beyond the expectation of the buyer).
14. Kaufman, 353 N.W.2d at 300. See also Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 311
N.W.2d 10 (N.D. 1981), which first stated the requirement of "unreasonable danger" as an
integral part of the strict liability doctrine in North Dakota.
15. 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
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makes the degree of care exercised by either the plaintiff or by the
manufacturer irrelevant.' 6  Therefore, the manufacturer is not
allowed to defend against a strict liability theory upon the ground
that it was free of negligence. In like manner the plaintiff's con-
duct should not be scrutinized in the product liability claim.'
7
The North Dakota Supreme Court has given us law that
reflects the changing view of society. In a simpler day, ideas of
justice in the United States were almost exclusively founded on a
general sense of a natural law theory of action: act unto others as
you want them to act unto you.' 8 Society has replaced this natural
law theory with a civil rights theory that certain "rights" exist
independently of action by persons: people have a "right" to be
free of certain types of injury, irrespective of who caused the
injury or the reason why the person acted."9 Civil rights theory
now provides the same mainspring of legal development that nat-
ural law theory once did. Understanding that philosophical point
allows us to give a framework to what otherwise appears as confu-
sion in products law.
Let us catalog some products liability cases that are most fre-
quently cited in briefs to trial courts. As we do so, note how the
philosophical standard of an independent right to good products
(strict liability) differs from the negligence standard of action.
In Bismarck Baptist Church v. Wiedmann Industries,20 a neg-
ligence case, the court stated:
negligence is never presumed merely from proof of the
happening of an accident, but such negligence must be
affirmatively established....
... if from the plaintiff's evidence it is equally probable
that damage resulted from a cause for which the defend-
ant actions would not be responsible: then a prima facie
case of proximate cause has not been made and plaintiff
16. Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales and Service, 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1974).
17. Id. at 340. However, this part of Mauch was legislatively overruled in 1987. The
North Dakota legislature defined "fault" as follows:
... acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless towards the
person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to tort liability
or dram shop liability. The term also includes strict liability for product defect,
breach of warranty, negligence, or assumption of risk, misuse of product ...
failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid an injury or mitigate damages.
N.D. CENT. CODE 32-03.2-01 (1987).
18. See Luke 6:31 ("And as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them").
19. See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
20. 201 N.W.2d 434 (N.D. 1972).
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cannot recover.
In contrast, the court in Herman v. General Irrigation Co.,' a
products liability case, stated:
[t]he nature of the defect need not be precisely estab-
lished, especially if a complex product is involved. A
defect may be inferred from proof that the product did
not perform as intended.... 2
The North Dakota Supreme Court is on solid ground in
allowing the mere fact of malfunction to be prima facie evidence
of a defect even though a mere malfunction is not evidence of neg-
ligence. A number of courts outside of North Dakota have held
that the plaintiff only need prove that a product has malfunctioned
during normal operation; evidence of malfunction gives rise to an
inference of product defect, establishing a prima facie case for jury
consideration. 24 Of course, along with the evidence of malfunc-
tion, some evidence by the plaintiff must be shown that negates
abnormal use and eliminates other causes of the accident.2 5
Even though a product is not defective under the community
negligence standard of what the product should be, the manufac-
turer may be negligent in performance of a contract requirement
to manufacture a defect free product. For example, in Layman
v. Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc.,26 the North
Dakota Supreme Court stated:
The duty to protect another from injury... may arise
out of ... contract .... The mere breach of a contract
does not, by itself, furnish a basis for liability in tort for
negligence; however, negligent conduct may be involved
in the breach of a contract or, even if there has been no
breach of contract, liability in tort for negligence may
arise because of injury to persons resulting from negli-
gence in the course of the performance of the
contract....
When one undertakes by contract to perform a cer-
21. Bismarck Baptist Church v. Wiedmann Indus., 201 N.W.2d 434, 440 (N.D. 1972).
22. 247 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1976).
23. Herman v. General Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472, 474 (N.D. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Greco v. Buccioconi County Buccioconi Eng'g Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.
Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969Xstating that plaintiff need only prove product
malfunction to give inference of product defect). See also Annotation, Strict Products
Liability: Product Malfunction or Occurrence of Accident as Evidence of Defect, 65 A.L.R.
346 § 2 (1988).
25. Herman, 247 N.W.2d at 474.
26. 343 N.W.2d 334 (N.D. 1983).
1991]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
tain service [negligently fails to do so, and causes injury];
the injured person has a right of action against the offend-
ing contractor which is not based on any contractual obli-
gation but rather on the failure of the contractor to
exercise due care in the performance of his assumed
obligation.
The community standard for a defective product of manufac-
ture and the standard for negligence may be combined in yet
another way: the negligent act of a retailer may be used to reach
the manufacturer under strict liability law. In Foremost Insurance
Company v. Rollohome Corp.,2 8 the court stated that a manufac-
turer who delegates tasks of an inherently dangerous nature to an
independent contractor is not insulated from liability because of
negligence of the independent contractor in performing the tasks,
such as the assembly of a product that is dangerous if not properly
assembled. 9 In such instances the manufacturer is liable for the
defects in the product and for the negligence of the independent
contractor.3 o
A "dealer" can be held by the jury to be an agent of a manu-
facturer if the dealer: was a part-time vendor of the manufac-
turer's products (among others); was a warranty service agent for
the manufacturer; was listed as an authorized service agent for the
manufacturer; made warranty calls and billed warranty work on
such calls to the manufacturer; received free service materials
from the manufacturer; and was instructed to call the manufac-
turer for assistance on service calls.3' If the dealer is the "agent"
of the manufacturer, then the manufacturer in effect will be liable
under strict liability for a defect caused by the dealer's
negligence.32
This catalog of the products lawyer's oft-cited products cases
would not be complete without mention of Keller v. Vermeer
Manufacturing Co. 33 The Keller court stated that the doctrine of
momentary forgetfulness is applicable in cases of product liability.
Further, "testimony of an absence of thought warrants an instruc-
tion [on momentary forgetfulness], as does testimony of momen-
27. Layman v. Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 334, 340-41
(N.D. 1983) (citation omitted).
28. 221 N.W.2d 722 (N.D. 1974).
29. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Rollohome Corp., 221 N.W.2d 722, 727 (N.D. 1974).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 726.
32. Id.
33. 360 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1984).
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tary forgetfulness [itself]."'34  The doctrine of momentary
forgetfulness is that a "reasonable man... does not possess a per-
fect memory, is not perfectly attentive, and is not infallible. Thus,
in appropriate cases, the judges can instruct on forgetfulness or
lack of thought [for the jury to consider].
35
These cases put into capsule form much of the North Dakota
products liability law. If you know these cases well, you are on
firm ground in a battle involving a product.
There is one further point that must be understood to try a
products case in North Dakota. A jury must be instructed, in prod-
ucts cases occurring before 1987, on both strict liability and negli-
gence theories. This is the effect of Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry &
Machine Co.;36 Butz v. Werner;37 and Mauch v. Manufacturers
Sales & Service, Inc..38 Hoerr states it distinctly: if a defendant is
liable under both strict liability and negligence theories, plaintiff is
entitled to judgment on the theory that affords the greatest recov-
ery.39 Hoerr quoted with approval a New Jersey case which says
plaintiff is entitled to "judgment on the theory which affords the
greatest recovery.' '40 Hoerr also cited the Mauch case, in which
plaintiff wanted both theories going to the jury; the trial court sub-
mitted only one theory (chosen by the trial court) to the jury; the
supreme court reversed.41 An implication of the language used in
the Hoerr case was that plaintiff does not have to make an election
before the case goes to the jury. Butz made it explicit: separate
jury verdict forms must be given to the jury, so that plaintiff can
elect, after the verdict, which theory he will take for judgment.42
Hoerr, Butz, and Mauch involved accidents before 1987. In
1987, the legislature enacted North Dakota Century Code sections
32-03.2-01 and 03. These statutes direct that negligence of the
plaintiff should be compared to the strict products liability "fault"
of the manufacturer. The statute contradicts the North Dakota
case law which kept separate the jury instructions and findings
34. Keller v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 360 N.W.2d 502, 504 (N.D. 1984).
35. Id. at 507. Erickson v. Schwan, 453 N.W.2d 767 (N.D. 1990) held that this
instruction can only be given if the injured person survives to testify that he momentarily
forgot the instruction.
36. 376 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1985).
37. 438 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1989).
38. 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
39. Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 328 (N.D. 1985).
40. Id. (citing Mowery v. Fantastic Homes, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978)).
41. Id. at 327.
42. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 515-16 (N.D. 1989).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-01, 03 (1987).
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regarding strict liability and those regarding negligence.44
Thus, the legislature appears, in effect, to have overruled the
theory used by the North Dakota Supreme Court. It is now appro-
priate for the court to combine the fault assessment of strict liabil-
ity and negligence in jury instructions and verdict forms in
product warning cases. However, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has judges with firmly held positions. They have avoided
telling the trial courts what effect North Dakota Century Code
section 32-03.2-03 will have on the court's theory of difference in
products warning cases.4 5 This past reluctance of the North
Dakota court to embrace the now legislatively enacted theory may
make North Dakota Century Code section 32-03.2-03 less than it
seems.
In the "real world of trial," attorneys should not forget the
community standards involved in both negligence and strict liabil-
ity. Although the court has ignored it to date, there is a real com-
munity standard of reasonableness involved in the "defect" of a
product. The legislature by demanding combined fault assess-
ments is trying to tell the court to explicitly use the community
standard of "reasonableness." Lawyers who forget the community
standards lose sight of what they must tell the jury to impel the
jury to act as the advocate wants.
III. WARNINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS
The historical force in the development of products liability
law has been the existence of manufacturing defects and design
defects. Such defects are rarely litigated today. Perhaps products
in general are subject to better manufacturing and design safe-
guards. Rather, most products cases now involve a claim of inade-
quate warning.46 Plaintiffs now often find it is difficult to label a
socially desirable machine defective because of design choices; it is
far easier to find, by hindsight, that a specific warning would have
prevented the conduct that merged with the machine to cause the
44. 438 N.W.2d at 515-16. In Butz, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:
A combined fault assessment form would effectively require comparison of the
defendant's strict liability with the plaintiff's ordinary negligence, which . . . is
not legal fault under a strict products liability claim. The result could be to
improperly diminish or alter the recovery which the plaintiff would have been
entitled to under separate fault assessments.
Id.
45. Id. at 516, n.4.
46. See generally Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information 48 TEX. L.
REV. 398 (1970); Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision, 53
TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1975).
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accident. 7
Notice-because we will later discuss it-that warnings
involve the merging of an actor's conduct with a product's exist-
ence. The warnings defect cannot exist outside of the context of
someone doing something or failing to do something.
*To understand North Dakota's products law regarding warn-
ings, a number of cases must be read. Before we discuss the practi-
cal points in the trial of cases involving instructions and warnings,
it is best to shortly describe the holdings in the basic cases.
In Anderson v. Teamsters Local 116 Building Club, Inc. ,48 the
court discussed the seller's duty to give an appropriate warning.49
The court noted that a product may be defective ("unreasonably
dangerous") because the seller fails to give an appropriate warn-
ing, even though the product is well designed and manufactured,
and, except for the warnings, is the best product man can manu-
facture."0 The Anderson court explained that the duty to provide
an appropriate warning may be subdivided into a duty to provide
appropriate instructions for safe use, both intended and reasonably
anticipated, and a duty to warn against dangers inherent with mis-
use, both known and reasonably anticipated.5 '
In Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc.,52 the court
held that when defendant's negligence is the theory of recovery,
then defendant may defend on the basis of plaintiff's negligence in
disregarding warnings.53 The court explained that plaintiff's con-
duct in regard to warnings (on the issue of defendant's negli-
gence) should be "scrutinized in ordinary contributory negligence
terminology. '54 But under the strict liability doctrine, which
places emphasis on the product, the degree of care by the manu-
facturer is irrelevant. Therefore, the manufacturer is not allowed
to defend against strict liability for lack of warnings upon the
ground that the manufacturer was free of negligence.55 In like
manner, plaintiff's conduct should not be "scrutinized in ordinary
47. Note that warnings involve the merging of an actor's conduct with the product's
existence. The warnings defect cannot exist outside of the context of someone doing
something or failing to do something. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48. 347 N.W.2d 309 (N.D. 1984).
49. Anderson v. Teamsters Local 116 Bldg. Club, Inc., 347 N.w.2d 309, 311 (N.D.
1984).
50. Id.
51. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court also noted that the duties to give
appropriate instructions and warnings can be duties that arise out of the duty of due care as
well as arising out of the obligation of strict liability for defective products. Id.
52. 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
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contributory negligence terminology" in a strict liability warnings
claim.56 [The reader is here cautioned that this part of the case has
been legislatively overruled by North Dakota Century Code sec-
tion 32-03.2-01 (1987).]
The Mauch court also noted that only unforeseeable misuse of
the product can be assessed by the jury as a cause for which the
plaintiff's recovery will be reduced (not barred) proportionately.
5 7
In addition, the court determined that assumption of risk can only
exist if the plaintiff actually knew of the defect and danger and had
a reasonable choice not to use the product.5 8
In Olson v. A. W. Chesterton Co.,59 the North Dakota Supreme
Court heard a case involving misuse of a product.60 The court held
that misuse of a product, obviousness of the danger, and assump-
tion of the risks are defenses to strict liability claims. 6' Further,
the court noted that strict liability for a defective product can
occur for lack of adequate warnings for operation of a properly
designed and manufactured product.6 2
In Butz v. Werner63 the'court concluded that when no warn-
ing is given, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of a presumption
that an adequate warning if given would have been read and
heeded.64 It is the corollary to the idea that when a warning is
given, the defendant is entitled to the presumption that his ade-
quate warning will be read and heeded.
In Jacobs v. Anderson Building Co.,65 the court refused to
allow such presumptions (that warnings would have been read if
given) to be the subject of judicial instructions in a negligence
action.66 Thus, in a products liability case the presumption is
given, but in a negligence case the presumption is not given.
The North Dakota Supreme Court examined a case involving
warning against misuse in Seibel v. Symons Corp..67 Seibel held
that a warning of danger against foreseeable misuse of a product
56. Id.
57. 345 N.W.2d at 348. Astute counsel may argue that the words used in the 1987
statutory definition of fault in N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-01 are a legislative overruling of
this part of the case.
58. Id. Only if the plaintiff understood the danger can the jury assess the plaintiff's
fault to reduce (not bar) the plaintiff's damages proportionately. Id.
59. 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
60. Olson v. A. W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
61. Id. at 534-38.
62. Id. at 535.
63. 438 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1989).
64. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1989).
65. 459 N.W.2d 384 (N.D. 1990).
66. Jacobs v. Anderson Bldg. Co., 459 N.W.2d 384, 387 (N.D. 1990).
67. 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1974).
[Vol. 67:1
N.D. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
must not only be given, but also must be adequate and reasonably
adapted to be communicated to persons in the zone of danger.6
A warning to an employer of the user does not necessarily insulate
the manufacturer from liability: the means of communicating the
warning must be such as to be reasonably expected to reach, and
to be understood by the employee or other user.69
Layman v. Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc.7 °
also involved a warning which was given by the defendant to the
employer but which did not reach the employee who needed the
warning." x The court again held that the mere giving of a warning
does not necessarily insulate the defendant from negligence liabil-
ity for breach of the duty to give adequate instructions or
72warnings.
Finally, in this category of important warnings, we come to
the cases where proper warnings have been given and received,
but have been forgotten. Keller v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co. 3
held that an instruction on "momentary forgetfulness" of a dan-
ger, or a warning of the danger, by the plaintiff is applicable in
cases of product liability based on negligence of a defendant man-
ufacturer to warn.74
In Barsness v. General Diesel & Equipment Co., Inc.,75 the
North Dakota Supreme Court looked at a retailer's responsibility
to warn.76 The retailers of a product, in addition to the manufac-
turer of the product, have a liability for negligent failure to warn
of dangerous conditions of the product.77 The adequacy of a warn-
ing should ordinarily be decided by a jury, not by the judge on a
motion for elimination of that issue.78
Now let us look at the problems the above summarized cases
68. Seibel v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50, 55 (N.D. 1974).
69. Id. at 52.
70. 343 N.W.2d 334 (N.D. 1983).
71. Layman v. Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 334, 337-38
(N.D. 1983).
72. Id. at 342-43.
73. 360 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1984).
74. Keller v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 360 N.W.2d 502, 507 (N.D. 1984). Testimony by the
plaintiff of his own forgetfulness, or of an absence of thought, warrants an instruction that
momentary forgetfulness may be reasonable and not negligent. Id. at 506. The court
explained that a reasonable man does not possess a perfect memory, is not perfectly
attentive, and is not infallible. Id. at 507. Thus, in appropriate cases, a judge can tell the
jury it is not negligence in itself for the plaintiff to momentarily forget something that was
known by him.
75. 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986).
76. Barsness v. General Diesel & Equipment Co., 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986).
77. Id. at 845. Barsness brought the action for negligent entrustment and negligent
failure to warn. Id. at 841.
78. Id. at 846.
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create regarding trial of products cases involving product instruc-
tions or warnings. The requirement that the product defect must
create an "unreasonable danger" is an integral part of North
Dakota products liability law.79 Because of this requirement, the
type, or extent, of warnings going with the product involves the
balancing of interests normally associated with the community's
determinations of negligence. For example, a well designed and
constructed knife can cut fingers. Ordinarily a reasonable man
does not think of a well designed and constructed knife as defec-
tive (unreasonably dangerous) because it is not accompanied by a
warning that a knife cuts. Likewise, a well designed and con-
structed oil well equipment component ordered by a large oil
company's well-staffed engineering department is not defective
because it is not accompanied by a university professor who will
re-teach the oil company's excellent engineers the engineering
courses on the use of the equipment. The danger that exists in
these products is not "unreasonable" under the circumstances of
the sale. Hence, no strict liability exists for knives and oil well
equipment because they do not have detailed instructions on their
use. Therefore, the balancing of interests as to what is reasonable
under the circumstances is what determines the adequacy of the
warnings. The consumer in these cases is supposed to know cer-
tain dangers, and it is not unreasonable for the manufacturer to
omit instructions about those dangers.8 0
Because strict liability in products liability cases requires the
presence of "unreasonable" danger, a jury must use the same
thought process both (1) in determining negligence for failure to
warn, and also, (2) in determining a product defect for failure to
warn. The North Dakota Supreme Court has missed that point in
requiring a complicated set of alternative theories to be given to
the jury.'
It is in the failure to warn cases that the North Dakota
Supreme Court has been at its worst, ignoring how trials actually
work and what the jury is to be told. This has created a need: it is
in failure to warn cases that the plaintiff and defendant need the
best advocate to persuade the jury. Complicated jury instructions
need the clarity of effective advocacy.
79. Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 311 N.W.2d 10 (N.D. 1981).
80. See generally Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981) (discussing standards of expected behavior and
knowledge).
81. For example, in Minnesota, failure to warn is submitted as a separate jury
instruction under either negligence or product defect instructions, but not both.
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Other courts have recognized that the law must be in a format
and statement that allows the law to be followed by the lay people
that make up a jury. 2 These courts have recognized that a proper
jury decision is impossible when the instructions to the jury are
past comprehension of the ordinary juror.
Appellate judges should be forced to periodically listen to trial
judges reading an entire set of jury instruction. The average per-
son (even an average judge) talks at only a rate of 70 words per
minute.8 3 That is about four minutes to read a typed page. That is
about one hour to listen to the usual 20 plus pages of the trial
court's instructions to the jury. Even philosophers cannot grasp
that much material thrown at them in a once-heard speech. If
there is some semantic difference in the jury instruction for negli-
gent failure to warn as compared to the jury instruction for strict
liability failure to warn, the difference will be ignored by the jury.
Justice Levine's dissent in Butz v. Werner8 4 rates four stars for its
discussion of the need to simplify jury instructions in products
warnings cases.
Due to the court's present insistence that the jury be given
instructions on both liability theories for failure to warn, plaintiffs
now secure a favorable emphasis in the jury instruction. The
amount of time spent by the judge in instructing on the failure to
warn becomes an oral, and an actual, pressure on the mind of the
juror. The juror strives to find what the court has emphasized: a
failure to warn against a foreseeable risk.
Before 1989, almost any product case went to the jury to
determine the community standard of failure to warn. This was
because the North Dakota Supreme Court gave up the court's
duty to set limits on what a jury could decide in regard to the duty
to warn. This is illustrated best by Barsness v. General Diesel &
Equipment Co.."5 In essence, Barsness stands for the proposition
that any claim for failure to warn will go to the jury.
The jury was not asked whether the defendant adequately
warned the user to not lift people with cranes.8 6 In Barsness the
82. See Mauch, supra note 16. In Mauch, the court held that the jury must be
instructed twice on the manufacturers duties to instruct and warn: once under negligence
theories, and secondly, under strict products liability theory. Id. cf Butz v. Werner, 438
N.W.2d 509, 516 (N.D. 1989) (stating that one instruction may be used to instruct juries on
negligence and strict liability).
83. See generally J. DeVito, COMMUNICATION: CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES (1971).
84. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 521 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting).
85. 383 N.W.2d 840, 845-46 (N.D. 1986).
86. Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., Inc., 383 N.W.2d 840, 846 (N.D. 1986).
The North Dakota Supreme Court set forth the questions as follows:
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supplier of the crane gave a clear instruction and a specific warn-
ing.87 The instruction and warning could not be more pointed.
The law is also clear:
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably
assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is fol-
lowed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous.88
Yet the court gave up its responsibility ("we cannot conclude that
reasonable men could not differ").89 The court demanded that a
jury determine whether the warning was not adequate so that the
product became defective.90 The court was telling litigants that
the most pointed instruction and warning would not be ruled on as
a matter of law. This is an element of unpredictability and insta-
bility which is not conducive toward justice (if one conceives of
justice as an ordered system, with set boundaries). The court
refused to set boundaries on what a jury could consider an "unrea-
sonable" warning.9' This is contrasted with the usual liability deci-
sions the court makes whether any duty exists at all. Thus, in
warning cases, skill of the advocate with the jury becomes of criti-
cal importance, even more important than the law. Barsness
impliedly tells us that the jury can be persuaded to decide on the
basis of what it "feels" is right; and the court will not intervene.92
The fact that the danger is open and obvious does not auto-
General Diesel also contends that it warned of the dangers involved when lifting
people with cranes, thereby discharging its duty to warn. The warning given by
General Diesel was contained in the operator's manual supplied with the crane:
'6. Many people have been injured when riding crane hooks or loads or while
being lifted in manbaskets. They have no control over how they are handled
and no protection from impacts or falls. Small mistakes can be fatal."
'Do not lift people with cranes. Use ladders, scaffolds, elevating work
platforms or other equipment designed to lift people, but do not use cranes.'
While the warning given in the operator's manual is obviously evidence
favorable to General Diesel, we cannot conclude that reasonable men could not
differ as to its adequacy under the facts presented in this case. Therefore, we
cannot hold that it was adequate as a matter of law. Adequacy of the warning
given should be left for determination by the jury at trial.
Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id.
88. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TonTs § 402A comment j (1965)).
89. 383 N.W.2d at 846.
90. Id.
91. The court's desire to submit all warnings cases to the jury is also apparent in Butz,
where the court stated that the existence of a duty to warn is a jury question when it
depends upon factual determinations. Butz, 438 N.W.2d at 511.
92. Barsness, 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986).
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matically mean the manufacturer does not need to warn of the
danger.9 3 The best that a defendant should hope for is a jury
instruction that an open and obvious danger "is merely one factor
to be considered" in determining whether a warning is needed.
Let us go back to our example of the knife. The fact that a sharp
knife cuts, and everyone knows that, does not, in North Dakota,
mean a court is to determine the existence of a duty to warn of
that hazard. That open danger "is merely one factor to be consid-
ered" by the jury in determining whether the product is defective
for lack of warning. That is the teaching of the North Dakota cases
before 1989. 04
In 1989, the North Dakota Supreme Court for the first time
exercised the court's right to determine as a matter of law whether
the defendant had properly warned. In Morrison v. Grand Forks
Housing Authority,9 5 the court found no duty to warn that a bat-
tery-operated device does not work without the battery. The
court determined as a matter of law that the defendant had given
proper warning. 96 In Morrison, the court paid lip service to its
previous holdings that strict liability has nothing to do with the
reasonableness of conduct, and that the jury is entitled to deter-
mine whether the product is "defective." 7 The North Dakota
Supreme Court then (almost incredibly when contrasted with Bar-
sness) found the product not defective.9 Morrison simply cannot
be reconciled with Barsness.09 Hence, Morrison does represent a
practical limit to the court's tolerance to its own previous open-
handed language in warnings cases. Trial courts can use Morrison
to control some cases that would otherwise go to the jury under
the Barsness doctrine.
Once past the forest of instructions on warnings, the jury must
plunge into the thicket the court has created concerning the plain-
tiff's forgetfulness. For example, the effect of North Dakota cases
such as Keller v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co.,1°° is to tell the jury
that if the plaintiff testified that he forgot the warnings the manu-
93. Butz, 438 N.W.2d at 512, n.2.
94. Id. at 517.
95. 436 N.W.2d 221 (N.D. 1989).
96. Morrison v. Grand Forks Housing Authority, 436 N.W.2d 221, 228 (N.D. 1989).
97. Id. at 227-28.
98. Id. at 228. The court stated that "[e]ven though the instructions do not explicitly
state that the detector will not work without a battery, the implication appears obvious."
Id.
99. Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., Inc., 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986) (hilding
that a clear statement not to lift people is not necessarily a sufficient warning).
100. 360 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1984) (defining the basic "forgetfulness" doctrine in North
Dakota).
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facturer gave the plaintiff, the jury may judge plaintiff negligent
but doesn't have to, for reasonable men can forget.' 0' Or, if the
jury found the product warning defective,10 2 plaintiff cannot be
found negligent because he/she forgot the defective instruction or
warning.' 0 3
The jury is also instructed that if this incident occurred before
1987, and if the product is found defective, the plaintiff can be
found negligent for his forgetfulness, but only if plaintiff's negli-
gence is an intervening cause of his own injury.' Finally, the
jury is told that if the product was found to be defective, plaintiff
cannot be found to have voluntarily assumed the risk of operating
the product contrary to instructions, if his forgetfulness was not
negligent, but if plaintiff's forgetfulness was negligent, then the
plaintiff can be found to have assumed the risk.'05 Thus, a skillful
advocate is required to clear a path for the jury through the
thicket of forgetfulness instructions.
Seibel v. Symons Corp.,106 and Barsness v. General Diesel &
Equip. Co.,107 are troublesome to handle in actual trials because
they do not discuss limitations other courts have placed on jury
instructions regarding warnings. 10 8 The North Dakota Supreme
101. Keller v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 360 N.W.2d 502, 507 (N.D. 1984). In Erickson v.
Schwan, 453 N.W.2d 765 (N.D. 1990), the North Dakota Supreme Court expanded on the
doctrine of momentary forgetfulness. Id. at 767. The trial court had determined there was
evidence from which the jury could infer that the deceased had knowledge of the danger,
but that there was insufficient evidence to allow an inference that he "momentarily forgot"
the danger. Id. The court affirmed, holding that unless the victim survives for a period of
time to give his version of the mishap, there will be no direct evidence of the victim's state
of mind as to whether he "momentarily forgot" at the time of the accident. Id. at 769. The
court held that just placing yourself in a position of danger is not enough to allow the jury to
speculate that there is "momentary forgetfulness" which will allow the instruction. Id.
102. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1989). The parties can get a jury
instruction that the seller may assume it will be read and heeded. Id.
103. Keller, 360 N.W.2d at 504. A defective warning will be ignored by the consumer.
Id.
104. Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales and Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
105. Keller, 360 N.W.2d at 505.
106. 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1974). For a discussion of Seibel, see supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
107. 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986). For a discussion of Barsness, see supra notes 76-79
and accompanying text.
108. Other courts have pointed out that there is no duty to give instructions regarding
that body of information possessed by the occupational group that normally uses the
product. See, e.g., Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981);
Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1980); Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1976); Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520
F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1975); Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1967); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348 (1983); Stevens v. Allis
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100. P.2d 723 (1940).
Moreover, many courts hold that where the conditions of use are prescribed by an
informed intermediary, there is no duty to warn or convey that body of knowledge
normally possessed by the occupational group of which the informed intermediary was a
member. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981);
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Court seems to want a surplus of warnings. Unlike the position of
the 8th Circuit,109 the North Dakota Court has instead emphasized
that the plaintiff must knowingly assume the risk of open and
obvious hazards, and the plaintiff's negligence in ignoring what
the usual reasonable man knows is no defense to strict liability. 10
This position encourages manufacturers to warn about everything
under the sun. On the other hand, an abundance of warnings may
become a problem. Communications experts point out that the
likelihood of a warning being read is reduced when the number of
warnings is increased. This is "sensory overload.""' The court
seems to ignore that sensory overload may occur.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes lia-
bility for a product that is "unreasonably dangerous."'" 2 But what
is the liability of the innocently ignorant seller? Assume the seller
does not know, and cannot know, of the defect. Is the seller
strictly liable for failure to warn of the hazard?
A majority of courts have relied upon comment j of section
402A of the Restatement, in concluding that a product is not
defective unless the manufacturer knew or should have known of
the product's danger at the time of distribution."13 For example,
in a Maine case, Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,'' the court
specifically held that when a plaintiff in a product defect case
alleges a failure to warn, the defendants may introduce evidence
to show that they neither knew nor reasonably could have known
of the dangerous characteristics of the product." 5 North Dakota
has not yet specifically ruled on this point. Thus, a North Dakota
litigator may present either position to support his/her client.
Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980); Haste v. American
Home Products Corp., 577 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1978); Helen Curtis Industries v. Pruitt, 385
F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967); Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.
1957); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 681 P.2d 1038 (1984);
Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 115 Cal.App.3d 431, 170 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1981); Younger v.
Dow Corning Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451 P.2d 177 (1969).
109. See, e.g., Hanes v. Powermatic Houdialle, Inc., 661 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1981) (there is
no need to warn of hazards that are open and obvious).
110. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 512, n.2 (N.D. 1989).
111. For discussion of the "sensory overload" caused by too many warnings, see Scott
v. Black and Decker, Inc., 717 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1983); Dunn v. Lederele Laboratories, 21
Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576 (1982); Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964). See supra note 13 for North
Dakota's definition of "unreasonably dangerous."
113. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.; see generally W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 697 (5th ed. 1984); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in
Products Liability Law - A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 586-87 (1980).
114. 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986).
115. Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 539 (Me. 1986).
1991]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
IV. DEFENSES TO PRODUCT DEFECT CLAIMS
In early products liability cases in North Dakota, the plaintiff's
fault was considered to reduce or bar the plaintiff's claim. An illus-
trative case for that period is Olson v. A. W. Chesterson Co..
116
Olson stated that "misuse of a product, obviousness of the danger,
and assumption of risk are items that the finder of fact can take
into consideration in awarding or denying damages."
'
17
In 1984, the North Dakota Supreme Court eliminated negli-
gence of the plaintiff as a defense in product defect cases. The
manufacturer's defenses were sharply limited by Mauch v. Manu-
facturers Sales and Service," '1 which held that in a products liabil-
ity case, the degree of care exercised by plaintiff or by the
manufacturer is irrelevant.' 19 Thus, plaintiff's conduct should not
be examined in ordinary contributory negligence terminology in a
strict liability claim, and plaintiff's negligence is not a defense.
12 0
The court went on to say that the seller's only defenses are the
defenses of knowing assumption of risk and unforeseeable
misuse. 121
Mauch was decided at the same time as Day v. General
Motors Corporation.1 22 Day's opinion creates problems when read
with Mauch. Day held that the list of defenses set out by the South
Dakota Supreme Court in Smith v. Smith 12 3 is a partial list of the
defenses that may be available in a products liability action.
1 4
Day said there should be a case by case "equitable" determination
of what defenses are available in each case.'
25
Mauch said that defenses are limited to assumption of risk and
unforeseeable misuse. This cannot be reconciled with the Day
court's statement that a court can equitably allow additional
defenses. 126 Certainly, "equitable" case-by-case decisions of the
"legal" defenses available in tort cases introduce the length of the
chancellor's foot as the rule for decision. Day suggested that "the
116. 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
117. Olson v. A. W. Chesterson Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 534-37 (N.D. 1977). In addition
to the suggestion that the jury could consider the foolishness of the claimant, Olson did not
limit defenses to those listed. Id.
118. 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984). See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text for
discussion of Mauch.
119. Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 346 (N.D. 1984)
(citing FRUMEB AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16(4Xf), at 3B-156 (1983)).
120. Id. at 347.
121. Id.
122. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984).
123. 278 N.W.2d 155, 162 (S.D. 1979).
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fairness" of allowing additional defenses must be argued in each
products case tried.1 27 As a matter of practice after Day, the trial
courts were not inclined to listen to such "equitable" arguments
and usually limited the defenses to those set out in Mauch. The
problem of which defenses were available was settled by the 1987
legislature's listing of defenses.12
In products defects cases based on negligence, before 1987,
defendants looked to the North Dakota comparative negligence
statute, which provided that negligence of a plaintiff does not bar
his recovery absolutely "if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed must be diminished in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering."129
Generally, state and federal trial courts have ruled that where
there are several defendants, any individual defendant whose neg-
ligence is less than that of the plaintiff's negligence will not have
to pay any damages at all.'3 0 However, the North Dakota Federal
District Court case of Beaudoin v. Texaco, Inc.,' z" introduced a
new element into the assessment of North Dakota lawsuits. In
Beaudoin, the federal trial court decided that the comparative
negligence statute meant that the negligence of all defendants is
compared as a unit to that of the individual plaintiff.' 32 The jury in
Beaudoin found negligence to be 60% to plaintiff's employer (who
was not sued); 30% to plaintiff Beaudoin; and only 10% to defend-
ant Texaco.' 3 3 Texaco argued that it should not have to pay any-
thing because the jury found that its negligence was less than that
of the plaintiff.' 34 The federal court disagreed. The court rea-
soned that all the responsible parties' negligence was greater than
the plaintiff's. 3 5 Thus, the court awarded a judgment against Tex-
aco for the full amount of plaintiff's damages, reduced only by the
30% attributable to the plaintiff.1
3 6
As a result, Mauch, Day, and North Dakota Century Code sec-
tion 9-10-07 set out the general defenses available to the manufac-
127. Id.
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-01 (Supp. 1989).
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987).
130. See, e.g., Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1971).
131. 653 F. Supp. 512 (D.N.D. 1987).
132. Beaudoin v. Texaco, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 512, 517-18 (D.N.D. 1987).
133. Id. at 513. Plaintiff's employer could not be sued because of the bar of the North
Dakota Worker's Compensation statute. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 517-18.
136. Id. at 518.
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turer in product defect cases arising before July 1, 1987, and
Beaudoin explained one possible way to interpret the statute.
However, legislation passed by the North Dakota State Legis-
lature in 1987 solved many problems for the trial of accidents
occurring after July 1, 1987. The defenses in products cases were
clearly spelled out.137 In particular, North Dakota Century Code
sections 32-03.2-01, which defined "fault," and 32-03.2-03, which
specified the use of fault as a defense, are important.
North Dakota Century Code section 32-03.2-03 provided that
contributory "fault" does not bar recovery in an action for product
defect, but any damages are "diminished in proportion to the
amount of contributing fault attributable to the person recover-
ing.,13a The statute then went on to broadly define "fault" to
include failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid the injury or
mitigate the damages. 139 "Fault" included any acts or omissions
that are negligent toward the person or property of the actor or
others. 140 The statute specifically included "negligence" as a
defense to a claim of product defect based on strict liability.'
4 1
Assumption of risk, which the courts had thrown out, was placed
back in as a defense to a claim of product defect based on negli-
gence.' 42 Moreover, the 1987 statute defined the "fault" defense
to include "misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise
would be liable" as a defense whenever the misuse was "negli-
gent" in regard to "the actor or others. 1 4 3 Thus, negligent misuse
of a product, even if foreseeable, is now a defense to a product
defect claim.
In short, the statute provided a broad range of defenses avail-
able to the products manufacturer for accidents occurring after
July 1, 1987. The 1987 statute legislatively overrules the Mauch
limitation of defenses.
The 1987 statute continued the system of comparative fault in
its pure form as adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court in
Day.144 A system of pure comparative fault is given to allow a
plaintiff recovery in a products defect case no matter whether the
theory of the defect is one "involving negligence or strict liability
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2 (1987). In this legislation, the legislature adopted the
combined fault doctrine of Beaudoin for cases other than products cases. Id.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-03 (1987).




143. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-01 (1987).
144. Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984).
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or breach of warranty."145
If the product has been modified in any way, attorneys should
be alert to the cases of Johnson v. John Deere Company, 46 and
Witthauer v. Burkhart Roetgen, Inc.1
47
In Johnson the jury found the plaintiff '/3 at fault for the acci-
dent, and the defendant 2/3 at fault. However, in spite of the com-
parative negligence statute in North Dakota, the defendant totally
escaped liability.
In granting judgment for the defendant, Federal District
Judge Conmy had to balance two conflicting North Dakota stat-
utes. The first statute was the 1979 Product Liability Act.141
Among other things, it provides that a manufacturer of a product
should not be held liable for any injury sustained as a result of a
product defect if "a substantial contributing cause of the injury...
was an alteration or modification of the product .... ,,149 The sec-
ond statute was the 1987 pure comparative fault statute for prod-
uct liability actions. 150 The statute provides for a recovery by the
plaintiff to the extent that the defendant has any fault at all in the
product liability action.
In the Johnson case, Judge Conmy submitted a special interro-
gatory to the jury whether there had been an alteration of the
product and whether the alteration was a "substantial contributing
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.' 15 ' When the jury answered both
of the questions in the affirmative, Judge Conmy held that the
alteration completely barred the plaintiff from any recovery under
strict liability, negligence or warranty theories.' 52 Judge Conmy's
reasoning was that the earlier 1979 statute was intended as an
absolute bar in the special case of product modifications, and it was
not defeated by the later statute allowing a percentage of recovery
in products cases based on comparative fault.
Judge Conmy's logic was not followed by the North Dakota
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1987) (emphasis added). Section 32-03.2-02 has a
system of modified comparative fault barring recovery if the plaintiff's negligence is greater
than the combined fault of the other parties contributing to the injury. Id. This section also
cross-references and excludes any claim of fault for "product defect." Id.
146. No. 84-87-217, slip op. (D.N.D. 1990). This case has since been affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Johnson v. John Deere Co., No. 90-5379 (8th Cir. 1991)
(1991 U.S. App. Lexis 5346).
147. 467 N.W.2d 439 (N.D. 1991).
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1 (Supp. 1989).
149. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-04 (Supp. 1989).
150. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-03 (Supp. 1989).
151. Johnson v. John Deere Co., No. 84-87-217, slip op. at 8 (1991).
152. Id. at 9.
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Supreme Court in Witthauer.15 3 In Witthauer, a medical lamp
had been bumped, and as a result, the heat protection shield had
fallen off.'" 4 It was foreseeable that this could happen. The
defendants claimed that the medical clinic's use of the lamp was
the use of the lamp with an alteration (no heat shield), and that
section 28-01.1-04 of the North Dakota Century Code protected
them. 55 The court concluded that the legislature could not have
intended a result so contrary to prevailing products liability doc-
trine, and held that section 28-01.1-04 does not prevent a manu-
facturer from being liable when the liability is premised on the
negligent failure to provide adequate warnings of danger resulting
from a foreseeable alteration of the product.' 56
Although the Witthauer case involved failure to provide
warning against a foreseeable alteration, it is easy to argue that
Witthauer stands for the proposition that even on design claims,
the manufacturer is liable if the alteration is foreseeable. In short,
Witthauer is the way around section 28-01.1-04. To claim the bar
of section 28-01.1-04 and the reasoning of Judge Conmy in the
Johnson case, the defense will have to argue that the alteration
was not foreseeable.
V. ECONOMIC DAMAGES
In Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc.,"5 7 the court held that
economic loss, as distinguished from injury to person or property,
cannot be recovered under the doctrine of strict liability, but only
may be recovered under theories of breach of warranties. 58 Ini-
tially, Hagert created problems by not defining "economic loss.' ' 59
It obviously is not meant to be the same as "economic loss" as used
in North Dakota Century Code section 32-03.2-04.160 The physi-
cal damage created when a defective electric cord damages a com-
puter is not economic loss, so plaintiff probably can recover the
physical loss. But what of the business the plaintiff could not do
that day because the computer was down? Is it an economic loss?
What if the defective electric cord also injured an employee and
153. Witthauer v. Burkhart Roentgen, 467 N.W.2d 439 (N.D. 1991).
154. Id. at 440.
155. Id. at 444. Section 28-01.1-04 provides that a manufacturer or seller will not be
held liable for an injury "where a substantial contributing cause of the injury... was an
alteration or modification of the product...." N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-04 (Supp. 1989).
156. Witthauer, 467 N.W.2d at 445.
157. 350 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1984).
158. Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 591, 595 (N.D. 1984).
159. Id. at 594.
160. N.D. CENT.-CODE § 32-03.2-04 (1987).
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the plaintiff employer must pay the hospital bills? Are those bills
the forbidden-to-collect economic loss? Those questions are yet to
be litigated in North Dakota.
Guidance may be obtained from the cases in Minnesota,
which have discussed the economic loss limitations in detail. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has described economic loss as follows:
Generally, "economic loss" has been defined as resulting
from the failure of the product to perform to the level
expected by the buyer and commonly has been measured
by the cost of repairing or replacing the product and the
consequent loss of profits, or by the diminution in value of
the product because it does not work for the general pur-
poses for which it was manufactured and sold. 1 '
Hagert sweepingly provided that any economic loss cannot be
recovered under the doctrine of strict liability.' Other courts
have distinguished between consumer transactions and commer-
cial transactions. For example, the Superwood 163 doctrine in Min-
nesota holds that only economic losses that arise out of commercial
transactions are not recoverable under tort theories or strict prod-
ucts liability theories.'6 Under Superwood, economic losses aris-
ing out of consumer product transactions are recoverable in
Minnesota.1
6 5
Hagert limited economic loss recovery to warranty theory.' 66
However, North Dakota case law holds that whenever a strict lia-
bility exists, implied warranty also exists, and vice versa.167 Appar-
ently, a plaintiff can recover for economic loss if he/she names
his/her theory correctly on the same set of facts. But why have
two different theories of recovery for the same set of facts? North
Dakota case law creating an implied warranty of no defect has not
been overruled.'68  This could be significant in future litigation
161. Minneapolis Soc. of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816,820-21. For additional guidance on the term "economic loss," the discussion in
Agristor Leasing v. Spindler, 656 F.Supp. 653 (D.S.D. 1987) and the definition in Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 449 (I11. 1982) are helpful.
162. Hagert v. Hatten Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 591, 595 (N.D. 1984).
163. Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 160 (Minn. 1981) (dealt
with the failure of a hot plate press).
164. Id. at 162.
165. Id. at 163.
166. 350 N.W.2d 591, 595 (N.D. 1984).
167. See Herman v. General Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1976) (holding a
product defective under warranty theory is defective under strict liability theory, and vice
versa); and Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805, 810 (N.D. 1965) (when a
product is sold by a merchant "'into the stream of trade" there is a judge-made implied
warranty of no defect that runs with the product to the ultimate consumer).
168. Lang, 136 N.W.2d at 809.
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regarding recovery for "economic" loss. The judge-made implied
warranty of no defect can give equal recovery to that which might
be recovered on a strict liability theory. 169 The sole practical
result of Hagert's limitation of economic recovery to warranty the-
ory might be to confuse juries, lawyers, and trial judges struggling
to write sensible jury instructions!
Is it a "wrong" to have a defective product? Of course it is,
under today's understanding of strict liability for defective prod-
ucts. Is it a tort? Of course it is. Hagert's limitation of damages for
a tort is in opposition to the North Dakota statutes which hold that
when a wrong exists, there shall be compensation for "all the detri-
ment" proximately caused.' 7 ° The North Dakota Supreme Court
can create a new tort of strict liability. Can it limit the damages
for the tort? Section 32-03-20 of the North Dakota Century Code
mandates recovery of damages for "all the detriment."'' Histori-
cally, the North Dakota Legislature has tended to eliminate judge-
made restrictions on the general theory of damages for tort. Thus,
the "economic loss" restriction of Hagert may become a battle-
ground in future cases.
Hagert held that (even without a contract limitation of liability
clause) economic loss cannot be recovered under a strict liability
theory.'72 The Hagert court cited the California case of Seely v.
White Motor Co.,17 in which the California court approved a dis-
tinction based on the type of harm caused by the defective prod-
uct.' 74 The Seely court suggested that the commercial situation
was different from the situation involving the ordinary con-
sumer. 175 The North Dakota Supreme Court should continue its
use of Seely and adopt this approach of distinguishing between
commercial transactions and the situation of a non-commercial
consumer. 176
Moreover, when both physical damage to the product itself
and physical damage to other items has occurred, most courts have
169. See Vigeant v. Zimmer, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Mass. 1985). Vigeant noted
that Massachusetts does not recognize a separate doctrine of strict products liability, but has
adopted warranty law to be "a remedy intended to be fully as comprehensive as the strict
liability theory of recovery that has been adopted by a great many other jurisdictions." Id.
at 1045 (quoting Back v. Wickes, 375 Mass. 633, 639, 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (1978)). This was
apparently the road North Dakota was traveling in Lang, and Lang has not been overruled.
170. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03-20 (1976).
171. Id.
172. Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 591, 595 (N.D. 1984).
173. 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
174. Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, -, 403 P.2d 145, 151-52 (1965).
175. Id. at 151.
176. Traditionally, consumers have been seen as needing increased protection.
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held that the economic loss flowing from the damage to the prod-
uct itself can be recovered, despite other limitations imposed by
the court on recovery of economic loss for strict liability. 177 Fur-
ther, when courts have faced a situation where the only remedy
for the economic loss is the tort remedy, they have found excep-
tions to their own rules prohibiting recovery of economic loss on
tort theories.
178
VI. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
In Day v. General Motors Corporation,'179 a question was certi-
fied by the District Court relating to the products liability theory
of recovery. If the plaintiff's percentage of fault is relevant, should
the determination include both plaintiff's accident producing
fault, and also, injury enhancing fault so as to reduce, or as the case
may be, defeat plaintiff's recovery?'8 °
The North Dakota Supreme Court answered the certified
question in the affirmative. The Court stated that the "injury
enhancement" defense should be implemented as follows:
The trier of fact will have to determine and find
which of the disputed facts will be accepted. The facts so
found will judicially determine what caused the accident
and what caused the injury and what, if anything,
enhanced the injury... [S]pecial interrogatories, in addi-
tion to the jury instructions and the special verdict, may
be necessary to resolve the causation factors.' 8
The North Dakota Supreme Court mandated no less than
three levels of causation to be determined: "[W]hat caused the
accident, and what caused the injury, and what, if anything,
enhanced the injury.' 81 2 This created a problem in constructing
the jury instructions, and also in constructing the special verdict
form.
Furthermore, when Day was read in conjunction with
Mauch,8 3 it became more confusing for injuries before the 1987
statute. In Mauch, the court seemed to indicate that the only
177. Cf S.J. Groves & Sons, Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431, 434
(Minn. 1985).
178. Cf. Reeder v. Old Oak Town Center, 124 Ill. App. 3d 1045, -, 465 N.E.2d 113,
116-17 (1984).
179. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984).
180. Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1984).
181. Id. at 357-58.
182. Id. at 357.
183. Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
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defenses available in products liability actions were the plaintiff's
unforeseeable misuse and the plaintiff's assumption of risk. 18 4
Halvorson v. Voeller'8 5 added to the confusion by holding
that the defendants may show a plaintiff's failure to wear protec-
tive devices as comparative negligence to reduce the amount of
the damages.'8 6 In Halvorson, the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated:
It is the jury's function in the first instance to decide if a
reasonable person exercising ordinary care would have
worn a helmet to avoid or mitigate injury in the event of
an accident. Only if (1) the jury answers this question in
the affirmative, and (2) there is competent evidence
establishing a causal connection between the plaintiff's
failure to wear a helmet and the injuries he received, may
the jury reduce damages to the extent that a helmet
would have decreased the plaintiff's injuries.'
8 7
Halvorson seemed to give the products liability defendant an
"end run" around Mauch's prohibition against using plaintiff's
negligence as a defense to liability. However, it was a cumbersome
approach to using the plaintiff's negligence (i.e., on the theory that
he enhanced an injury that could have otherwise been avoided).
In 1987, the North Dakota Legislature changed the defenses
the North Dakota Supreme Court had set up in products liability
cases, including the cumbersome method used in mitigation of
damages.' 88  Section 32-03.2-03 of the North Dakota Century
Code, which is effective as to accidents occurring after July 8,
1987, provides for a reduction of the plaintiff's verdict "in propor-
tion to the amount of [contributing] fault attributable to the per-
son recovering."'8 9 Section 32-03.2-01 defines "fault" to include
184. Id. at 347. Mauch indicated that plaintiff's negligence should not be compared to
a manufacturer's fault in a products liability, strict liability, theory. Id.
185. 336 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1983).
186. Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1983). Halvorson involved a
motorcycle accident. Id.
187. Id. Under present law, Halvorson might dictate a jury instruction essentially like
this:
If you find (1) it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to not wear a helmet, and (2)
the plaintiff would not have received some or all of his injuries had he worn a
helmet, then (3) the amount of damages awarded the plaintiff for the injuries he
sustained must be reduced in proportion to the amount of injury he would have
avoided by the use of the helmet. The burden of proof on both points (1) and (2)
rests with the defendant.
Id.
188. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-03 (Supp. 1989).
189. Id.
[Vol. 67:1
N.D. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
not only negligence and assumption of risk, but also "failure to
exercise reasonable care to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages."' 190
Although it would be technically possible for the North
Dakota Supreme Court to say that the difficult step by step sepa-
rate decisions previously prescribed by the court is still necessary,
it seems that the legislature wanted all fault to be considered in a
lump. This is much more sensible and is something the jury can
more easily understand and accomplish. Thus, the jury need only
answer what proportions of fault contributed to the injury; the
jury does not necessarily have to go through the formal process of
three separate levels of causation set out in cases like Halvorson.
VII. IMPLIED WARRANTIES
There are some things that the law says are so common that a
warranty will be implied just by everyday custom (unless the seller
specifically tells us that he isn't guaranteeing the product in those
ways). The most common implied warranties are: (1)
"merchantability"'' 9 and (2) "fitness for particular purpose," that
the seller knew the buyer intended.
192
These implied warranties are set out by statute. However, a
number of rules and counter-rules exist regarding implied warran-
ties. The rules and counter-rules generally follow the customs of
merchants for the last few centuries.19 3 Most of them are found in
the Uniform Commercial Code adopted by all the states. In North
Dakota the significant exception to the usual statutory warranty
defenses is the statutory defense of comparative fault to product
defect warranty claims.1
9 4
In Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Electric, Inc., 19 5 the court held
that it is necessary to determine whether the predominant factor
in the contract was (a) a sale of goods with labor incidentally
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-01 (Supp. 1989).
191. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31 (1983 & Supp. 1989). This means that the goods
are like others of the same kind, and no defects exist in the particular goods sold that do not
exist in the others of the same kind that the seller is selling. Id.
192. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-32 (1983 & Supp. 1989). This means the seller must
sell a product that can be expected to do the job for which it was sold. For example, if a
buyer tells the seller that he or she wanted something to unfreeze a water pipe, and the
seller sells the buyer a heat tape that doesn't come close to doing the job, the seller has
breached the warranty of reasonable fitness for the job the buyer intended it to perform.
See id.
193. Most of these rules have been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code, which
has been adopted by all fifty states.
194, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-03 (1989).
195. 258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977).
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involved; or (b) a service contract with goods incidentally
involved.' 96 This distinction is crucial to determine whether there
is a statutory implied warranty. If it is predominantly (a), a sale of
goods, the statutory UCC warranties apply. If it is predominantly
(b), a service contract, there is no statutory implied warranty of
fitness of purpose.'97 The court did not decide if there would be a
judge-made implied warranty of fitness in all service contracts.
In service contracts for construction of buildings, a judicially
created warranty of fitness for the purpose exists if: the contractor
held himself out as competent to undertake the contract; the
owner had no particular expertise in the kind of work contem-
plated; the owner furnished no plans, designs, or details; and, the
owner passively or specifically indicated his reliance on the experi-
ence and skill of the contractor.198
Northwestern Equipment, Inc. v. Cudmore "' involved a
repair contract, the predominant factor of which was services. 2°
The court specifically stated that this "services" case did not need
to be decided on the ground that there is an implied warranty of
fitness in a "services" contract other than those involved "with the
construction process." 2 0
1
Shirazi v. United Overseas, Inc. 2° 2 ends this catalog of cases
often used in the trial courts. Shirazi held that contract stipula-
tions printed on the back of a document will not be deemed to be
assented to in the absence of proof of plaintiff's knowledge thereof
before the sale.2 °3
The effect of the above basic product warranty cases has been
to favor plaintiffs at the expense of following long established rules.
The court seems bent on affirmatively finding new law and new
relief for old problems. North Dakota may well be the "easiest"
state in which the law will imply a warranty, implying a warranty
of fitness in any contract for a completed job or product, in the
absence of express statements, or even contrary to express denials
of warranty that might be found in some of the written
196. Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649, 652-53 (N.D. 1977).
197. Id. at 652.
198. Id. at 653.
199. 312 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1981).
200. Northwestern Equip., Inc. v. Cudmore, 312 N.W.2d 347, 348-49 (N.D. 1981).
201. Id. at 351. In this case, the evidence was found insufficient to find a breach of an
implied warranty of fitness for purpose even if legally an implied warranty of fitness existed.
Id. Further, the court specifically turned to a North Dakota Law Review article discussing
the extension of the sale of goods and implied a warranty of fitness to non-construction
contracts. Id. at 351 n.3.
202. 354 N.W.2d 651 (N.D. 1984).
203. Shirazi v. United Overseas, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 651, 656 (N.D. 1984).
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documents.2 o4
I am not concerned whether it is socially good or bad to have
implied warranties in all sales of services and products. What I am
concerned about is the appearance of change as a constant applied
by the court in any case. This is creating unnecessary uncertainty
for litigants at trial. Any good lawyer, whether for defendant or
plaintiff, now must advise his client that the North Dakota
Supreme Court may find an implied warranty in any contract for
either services or goods, and the existence of a disclaimer may
depend on plaintiff's oral skills in professing ignorance of a written
disclaimer.
The trial courts in North Dakota, in constructing the instruc-
tions for the jury, now must struggle to determine "whether the
predominant factor in the contract" was a service contract or a
sale of goods contract. In Air Heaters, the court stated that this
determination must be made.20 5 However, the court has not
given guidance as to what the trial court should do if it finds a
services contract for other than building construction. °6 If a serv-
ices contract exists, then the trial court is faced with the problem
of determining whether there should be a judicially created war-
ranty of fitness on which the jury should be instructed.
What makes this distressing is that the questions regarding the
existence of judicially created implied warranties are questions
that interact with existing negligence and strict liability law. In
other words, if there is predominantly a sale of goods, there is a
basis for applying the strict liability law of products. Implying a
warranty is not needed for social justice! Likewise, in services con-
tracts, a basis for liability for fault for negligence already exists;
warranty is not needed for social justice. Adding implied warranty
law to jury instructions which already contain negligence and
strict liability theories creates a mental bog which is unlikely to
produce theoretically correct jury instructions.
What makes the situation doubly distressing is that it can be
argued that it is contrary to statute to have judge-made implied
warranty. North Dakota is a "code" state. That is, the early North
Dakota legislature tried to enact a code of laws that would be suffi-
cient to answer all questions of relationships and liabilities. The
North Dakota Century Code contains a statute specifically declar-
204. Cf. Lord, Some Thoughts About Warranty Law: Express and Implied Warranties,
56 N.D. L. REV. 509, 626 (1980).
205. Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649, 652 (N.D. 1977).
206. Id.
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ing that "there is no common law in any case where the law is
declared by the code. ' 20 7 The North Dakota Century Code specif-
ically declares there to be implied warranties in certain situa-
tions.20  Further, the Code also specifically deals with
misrepresentations or false representations.0 9 It would be easy
(and theoretically best) if the North Dakota Supreme Court would
state that North Dakota Century Code section 1-01-06 (no com-
mon law where statutes exist) requires that the only implied war-
ranties are the implied warranties stated in the Code (and no
judge-made implied warranties can exist). Similarly, it could be
said that the Code specifies what is an actionable false representa-
tion; hence, the Code is sufficient to take care of those situations in
which the expectations of a plaintiff were aroused by actions of the
seller of a product. Dragging judicially created implied warranties
into products litigation creates unnecessary problems.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has experimented previ-
ously with judicially created implied warranties of fitness. In Lang
v. General Motors Corp.,210 the court implied a warranty of fitness
of a product.2 11 That experiment was cut short by the express
adoption of strict liability theory in Johnson v. American Motors
Corp..2 12 Although Johnson did not overrule Lang, but merely
added the better remedy to plaintiffs' armory, since Johnson the
judge-made implied warranty has not been used in the trial
courts.2 1 3
Northwestern Equipment, Inc. v. Cudmore214 created unnec-
essary problems by leaving open when and how often judge-made
implied warranties will be created.21 5 When an appropriate case
comes to the court it could be argued that the only implied war-
ranties in products cases are the statutory warranties; the only
rules for deciding whether a disclaimer of implied warranty is
good are the statutory rules; and there is not an implied warranty
in any services contract. If no implied warranty exists in services
contracts, an announcement by the court whether the statutory
law on misrepresentations takes care of expectations would be in
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987). See, e.g., Kaylor v. Iseman Mobile Homes, 369
N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1985).
208. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 41-02-31, 32 (1983).
209. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-03 (1983).
210. 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965).
211. Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805, 810 (N.D. 1965).
212. 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974).
213. Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57, 65 (N.D. 1974).
214. 312 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1981).
215. Northwestern Equip., Inc. v. Cudmore, 312 N.W.2d 347, 354 (N.D. 1981).
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order. Alternatively, if the court says an implied warranty in ser-
vice contracts exists, then the court should outline the way the
implied warranty can or can not be disclaimed. The court should
not evade the job of creating a total plan regarding implied war-
ranty for any contract to supply either a finished product or a
service.
VIII. DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that the seller may
disclaim warranties, but only if the disclaimer is "conspicuous." ' 6
In addition, the Code provides that the seller may limit the reme-
dies afforded to the buyer in the event of a breach of warranty that
was given.
2 17
Although it has sometimes been argued that the disclaimer of
all warranties is unconscionable, the Code specifically permits
it.218 It is only in the limitation of warranty section that it is pro-
vided that "limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconsciona-
ble."2 9 In other words, it is possible to totally exclude warranties
and all liability flowing from warranties.220 But if a warranty is
given, warranty damages cannot be limited for personal injury
from consumer goods.
In North Dakota, an exclusion of a warranty can only occur as
a "part of the basis of the bargain between the parties."2'2 Our
North Dakota Supreme Court has said that warranty disclaimers
are not effective unless explicitly negotiated between buyer and
seller and set forth with particularity.222 Disclaimers, to be effec-
tive, must be conspicuous or brought to the buyer's attention.2
3
216. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33 (1983).
217. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-98 (1983).
218. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33 (1983).
219. U.C.C. § 2-302 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-19 (1983)).
220. Cf. Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
remote manufacturer can disclaim warranties to an ultimate purchaser at retail where the
disclaimer is in the purchase contract between the retailer and the ultimate purchaser).
221. Scientific Application, Inc. v. Delkamp, 303 N.W.2d 71, 74 (N.D. 1981) (citation
omitted).
222. Id. at 74-75 (stating that mere notice of limitations of warranty which are not
incorporated into the contract and therefore not basis of the bargain is insufficient to
prevent a buyer from seeking recovery for breach of warranty).
223. See, e.g., Construction Assoc. v. Fargo Water Equip. Co., 446 N.W.2d 237 (N.D.
1989). The Construction Associates court quoted Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A.
Roberts Co., 86 II. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403, 410 (1980) which stated:
To be part of the bargain, a provision limiting the defendant's liability must,
unless incorporated into the contract through prior course of dealings or trade
usage, have been bargained for, brought to the purchaser's attention or be
conspicuous. If not, the seller has no reasonable expectation that the remedy
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In Construction Associates, Inc. v. Fargo Water Equipment
Co.,24 the North Dakota court pointed out that even if it is part of
the bargain, the limitation of remedies to the exclusion of "mini-
mum adequate remedies" is unconscionable and will not be
enforced, even when it is an agreement between commercial
parties.2
Therefore, in North Dakota, even in commercial contracts,
and even when the disclaimer was considered in setting the sales
price, if the limitations and exclusions "leave the non-breaching
party with no effective remedy," the limitations and exclusions
will be held to be unconscionable and not enforced in North
Dakota.22 6
In contrast with a warranty disclaimer, some contracts contain
provision against liability for negligence. Courts outside North
Dakota have often said that a disclaimer of liability for negligence
will generally fail, as it is against public policy, even where the loss
is purely economic. 2 7 However, some courts have pointed out
that where the parties are in equal bargaining positions and the
disclaimer of liability for negligence is clear and unequivocal, the
courts may recognize the disclaimer." 8
North Dakota Century Code section 9-10-06 provides that
everyone is to be responsible for their own negligence.2 29 In the
past, the North Dakota Supreme Court has generally not favored
contracts that try to protect a party against his/her own negli-
gence.2 30 However, in 1984, a court made up of new members
decided Bridston v. Dover Corp..231 In Bridston, the court
was being so restricted and the restriction cannot be said to be part of the
agreement of the parties. Nor does the mere fact that both parties are
businessmen justify the utilization of unfair surprise to the detriment of one of
the parties since the Code specifically provides for the recovery of consequential
damages and an individual should be able to rely on their existence in the
absence of being informed to the contrary either directly or constructively
through prior course of dealings or trade usage.
Id. at 410 (citations omitted).
224. 446 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1989).
225. Construction Assoc. v. Fargo Water Equip., 446 N.W.2d 237, 243 (N.D. 1989).
226. Id. at 244.
227. Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 24-25 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (it is
against public policy for a manufacturer of a soybean inoculant to contract against its own
negligence); Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmer's Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307
(1970) (a limitation of negligence liability for the purchase price of seeds is against public
policy where discovery as to "defective" seeds can only occur once the growing season is
already over).
228. See infra notes 239-248 and accompanying text.
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (1989) (willful acts and negligence liability).
230. See, e.g., Note, Negligence & Secondary School Sports Injuries in North Dakota:
Who Bears the Legal Liability?, 62 N.D. L. REV. 458 (1986).
231. 352 N.W.2d 194 (N.D. 1984).
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approved a contractual provision between parties of equal bar-
gaining power in a commercial setting, which protected a party
against its own negligence.232 As a result of Bridston, 3 it is likely
that some contractual limitations on negligence claims will be
upheld by the North Dakota Supreme Court.234
No North Dakota case law exists which is directly on point
regarding strict liability disclaimers. In Johnson v. American
Motors Corporation,2 35 the court explicitly adopted section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts (Second).2 36 Since that time, the court
has generally followed the Restatement and its annotations. The
Restatement states that the rule of strict liability cannot be
affected by any disclaimer in a consumer goods contract of sale. 37
Presently, no North Dakota case exists which considers
whether a contractual disclaimer of liability in a commercial sales
contract for products is effective to disclaim tort liability (predi-
cated on negligence or strict liability) in cases where the damaged
party was a business of substantial size. The authority is split in
other jurisdictions on this question.
A few jurisdictions have taken the position that such disclaim-
ers are per se invalid.238 The majority of courts have taken the
position that strict liability disclaimers in commercial contracts are
enforceable under certain limited circumstances. 39 Several com-
mentators argue that disclaimers for economic damages flowing
from damage to the product itself in contracts between commer-
cial contractors should be allowed no matter what other physical
or personal injuries are involved.2 40 The language in Hagert seems
to favor allowing disclaimers in commercial contracts for sale of
products.2 4 '
Viewing the cases as a whole, it appears that a strict liability or
negligence disclaimer in a commercial contract stands the greatest
likelihood of being enforced where all of the following circum-
232. Bridston v. Dover Corp., 352 N.W.2d 194 (N.D. 1984).
233. Id. See also notes 226-235 and accompanying text.
234. Cf. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 465
N.W.2d 614 (N.D. 1991).
235. 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974).
236. Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57, 66 (N.D. 1974).
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402, comment m (1964).
238. See, e.g., Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974)
(applying Oklahoma law). (Sterner remains the leading case for this position).
239. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.
1974).
240. Note, Products Liability in Commercial Transactions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1061
(1976); Krol, Aviation Products: Commercial Disclaimers, INS. L.J. 615 (1979).
241. Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1984). Cf S.J. Groves
& Sons, Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1985).
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stances are present: (1) the defective product has caused damage
to other property but not personal injury; (2) the buyer and seller
possessed roughly equal bargaining power; (3) the parties negoti-
ated and bargained for the disclaimer; (4) the disclaimer is clearly
applicable to the particular type of injury suffered, 42 and (5) the
enforcement of the disclaimer would not offend any public policy
of the forum. 43
One of the best reasoned decisions in this area is Salt River
Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.. 244 The court's holding discussed most of the
factors enumerated above:
We hold, however, that tort remedies may be waived.
Although tort law does not recognize "disclaimers" and
will not give them effect, it will recognize waivers. A
waiver will be given effect when it represents "an inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right." [citations omit-
ted] That relinquishment will be permitted where
commercial parties have equal bargaining positions so
that the choice was freely and fairly made and not forced
by the circumstances. Further, the parties must have
negotiated the specifications of the product and have
knowingly bargained for the waiver. Under these cir-
cumstances our courts will enforce the bargain, even if it
turns out to have been a bad bargain for one party or the
other. The agreement will not be enforced, however,
when it is the product of coercion or inadvertence. Tort
remedies may not be waived in an unknowing exchange
of forms between shipping clerk and order clerk. An
actual bargain must be made by those responsible for the
transaction.245
The language used by the court in Hagert v. Hatton Commod-
ities, Inc.246 seems to imply that in commercial contract cases
North Dakota is likely to follow the Salt River Project line of cases.
242. See Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 150 (3d Cir.
1974) (tort limitations of liability in commercial contracts will be construed most strongly
against the party relying on it).
243. See Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, _ 350 N.Y.S.2d 617,
623, 305 N.E.2d 750, 754 (1973) ("we see no reason why in the absence of some
consideration of public policy parties cannot by contract restrict or modify what would
otherwise be a liability between them grounded in tort"). Id.
244. 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984).
245. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 385, 694 P.2d 198, 215.
246. 350 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1984).
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On the other hand, the language used by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Construction Associates, Inc. v. Fargo Water
Equipment Company247 would appear to indicate that North
Dakota is likely to follow the Sterner Aero line of cases. The litiga-
tor and the trial judge must decide, based on his or her experience,
whether North Dakota will follow the Sterner Aero line of cases or
the Salt River Project line of cases of other jurisdictions.
IX. MISREPRESENTATION
A real estate sales case, decided on the grounds of the exist-
ence of fraud, points the way toward future developments in prod-
uct sales law. In Holcomb v. Zinke 4 8 the purchasers were not told
about defects in the home they purchased." 9 To decide the case,
the court looked to the doctrine of constructive fraud.2 0
Constructive fraud occurs when a person, without any fraudu-
lent intent, breaches a duty and thereby gains an advantage by
misleading another.251 In Holcomb the court agreed that the duty
to disclose is usually based on a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship existing between the parties. 2 2 However, there was no such
fiduciary or confidential relationship in the arms-length real estate
transaction in Holcomb.25 3 The court first noted the absence of
the usual reason for courts to require disclosure and went on to say
that - despite the lack of a fiduciary or confidential relationship -
there is a duty to disclose material facts which should in good faith
be disclosed.2-4Where there is a breach of the good faith duty to
disclose, by the passive concealment of material defects, there is
constructive fraud.2
5
Although Holcomb is a real estate case and it interprets the
constructive fraud statute, its statutory language is not limited to
sales or realty. Logically, the Holcomb doctrine could extend to
contracts of sales of products. If applied to the sales of products,
the Holcomb doctrine might mandate that when a seller passively
conceals material defects of which he knows or should know,
when the defects are not reasonably discoverable by the buyer,
and when the seller has gained an advantage by the failure to dis-
247. 446 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1989).
248. 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985).
249. Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 509 (N.D. 1985).
250. Id. at 510.
251. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-09 (1987).
252. Holcomb, 365 N.W.2d at 511.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 512.
255. Id.
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close (i.e., the properly prepared plaintiff testifies that he would
not have bought the product if advised of the defect), then the
seller has breached a duty to disclose and has committed a con-
structive fraud.
The court in Holcomb specifically created a "should have
known" negligence standard for misrepresentation.2 The court
specifically held that the seller of a house must disclose defects he
"should" know exist. 57 Constructive fraud does not require
fraudulent intent. Thus, a seller of a house in North Dakota must
not be negligent in discovering defects or disclosing those defects
to the buyer. It would seem that the same duty would apply to the
seller of any product (particularly in a commercial setting),
because Holcomb is based generally on the constructive fraud
statute.
The Holcomb court reasoned that the seller had a duty to dis-
close because of the "clearly superior position of the seller vis-a-vis
knowledge of the condition of the property being sold."25 8 Some
defendants, such as a retailer of a closed package, could use this
lack of opportunity for knowledge as a defense to the constructive
fraud doctrine in a products case. Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
could argue that a constructive fraud exists in almost any defective
or dangerous product where the manufacturers have engineering
employees with a superior opportunit over consumers to know of
engineering data that a potential problem exists. For example,
some plaintiff may soon be arguing a constructive fraud exists
because he or she was not told that the garage door opener he or
she purchased only had a working lifetime of 10,000 cycles.
A pair of 1990 North Dakota cases, West v. Carlson'59 and
Dewey v. Lutz' 60 emphasize the North Dakota Supreme Court's
tendency to allow fraud to be brought into contracts of sale.
Although both West and Dewey involved the sale of real estate, the
principles and reasoning involved in those cases could be applied
to products equally well. In both of those cases, the court worked
on the theory that a positive assertion, in a manner not warranted
by the information of the person making it, which is not true,
although the person believes it to be true, is a fraud. The court
required that when a party responds to an inquiry involving the
256. Id.
257. Holcomb, 365 N.W. 2d at 512.
258. Id.
259. 454 N.W.2d 307 (N.D. 1990).
260. 462 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 1990).
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subject matter of a proposed contract of sale, the response must
disclose full, accurate and truthful information. There is no inher-
ent theoretical reason why this doctrine must be limited to real
property purchases.
However, in Bourgoius v. Montana Dakota Utilities Co.,261 the
court refused to extend the doctrine of constructive fraud to situa-
tions involving independent businesses dealing at arms length
with each other.262 The court gave no theoretical reason why it
refused to extend the doctrine of constructive fraud beyond situa-
tions involving real estate sales between individuals.
Nonetheless, the court in Bourgoius went on to adopt a new
doctrine of fraud regarding commercial situations. Bourgoius
allowed a finding of actual fraud if there was some negligence.263
The court reasoned that section 9-03-08 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code, defining actual fraud, allowed fraud to be found if the
asserter was negligent in making the assertion.26 Thus in com-
mercial situations, the assertion of a fact because of negligence is
sufficient for the jury to find actual fraud and impose punitive
damages on the asserter. There is no inherent theoretical reason
why this new North Dakota doctrine of negligent fraud must be
limited to commercial construction contracts. It can apply to
statements made in product sales.
X. CONCLUSION
Society today is a society concerned about the consumer's use
of products, and that those products be safe. These concerns have
been reflected in the growing number of cases involving defective
products. People who assume that the rise in product litigation is a
result of less care in the manufacturing of products are mistaken.
The rise in litigation reflects society's concerns. Those concerns
have started to shape our products liability law in ways that are far
from finished. Until those concerns reach a common consensus
and resting place, products liability law will continue to be a com-
plex set of legal rules. This article is intended to be a guide to
attorneys trying to sort out those rules.
261. 466 N.W.2d 813 (N.D. 1991).
262. Bourgoius v. Montana Dakota Utilities Co., 466 N.W.2d 813, 819 (N.D. 1991).
263. Id. at 818.
264. Id.
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